Title

A DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON MILITARY INTERVENTION
AND COMPETITION BETWEEN DRUG CARTELS

Authors

Mario A. García-Meza, Francisco Venegas-Martínez
Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango
Facultad de Economía
Contaduría y Administración, MEXICO
Instituto Politécnico Nacional
Escuela Superior de Economía, MEXICO

Abstract

We explore the causes of the surge in violence in Mexico. In particular, we expose a dynamic competition game theory model where two drug organizations use warfare to compete for a turf in a certain territory. The inclusion of a military intervention in the model increases the violence in the zone given that the potential gains from holding territory are constant.

History

Received: March 16, 2018
Revised: July 27, 2018
Published: July 27, 2018

AMS Classification, Key Words

AMS Subject Classification: 91A80, 49N70, 21A05, 91A10, 62P25
Key Words and Phrases: differential games, duopoly, optimal control, drug cartels

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How to Cite?

DOI: 10.12732/ijpam.v119i4.3 How to cite this paper?

Source: International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics
ISSN printed version: 1311-8080
ISSN on-line version: 1314-3395
Year: 2018
Volume: 119
Issue: 4
Pages: 603 - 616

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This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).

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